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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  here  review  existing  evidence  for majority  inﬂuences  in  children  under  the  age  of
ten  years  and  comparable  studies  with  animals  ranging  from  ﬁsh  to apes.  Throughout  the
review, we  structure  the  discussion  surrounding  majority  inﬂuences  by  differentiating  the
behaviour of  individuals  in the  presence  of  a majority  and the underlying  mechanisms
and  motivations.  Most  of  the  relevant  research  to date  in both  developmental  psychology
and comparative  psychology  has  focused  on the  behavioural  outcomes,  where  a multi-
tude of mechanisms  could  be at play.  We  further  propose  that  interpreting  cross-species
differences  in  behavioural  patterns  is difﬁcult  without  considering  the  psychology  of the
individual. Some  attempts  at this  have  been  made  both  in  developmental  psychology  and
comparative psychology.  We  propose  that physiological  measures  should  be  used  to  sub-
sidize behavioural  studies  in  an  attempt  to understand  the  composition  of  mechanismsMRI and  motivations  underlying  majority  inﬂuence.  We  synthesize  the  relevant  evidence  on
human brain  function  in  order  to  provide  a framework  for future  investigation  in  this  area.
In addition  to  streamlining  future  research  efforts,  we  aim to create  a  conceptual  platform
for productive  exchanges  across  the  related  disciplines  of  developmental  and  comparative
psychology.© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The majority widely impacts our daily lives. The clothes
we  wear, the foods we eat, the phrases we use in a polite
conversation; they are all regimented by the majority, often
more  than we know or like to admit. Sometimes, we even
adjust  our behaviour to the majority despite our personal
preferences or even against better knowledge (Cialdini
and Goldstein, 2004). The experimental demonstration of
individuals  knowingly giving false responses in order to
conform  to a majority of peers is amongst the most impor-
tant  and certainly most discussed ﬁndings in Psychology
(Asch, 1956). In many of today’s societies, majority inﬂu-
ence  in general, but especially yielding to a majority against
one’s  own preferences has a bad reputation as essentially
lying out of weakness of character. Despite this negative
perception of the phenomenon, majority inﬂuence cru-
cially  structures human culture by promoting in-group
homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity, ensuring
temporally stable variation across groups, the very foun-
dation  of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 2009;
Henrich and Boyd, 1998).
In contrast to our knowledge on majority inﬂuences
in human adults (Bixenstine et al., 1976; Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004), we still know little about the extent to
which  children and other animals are inﬂuenced by the
majority, and thus about the developmental trajectories
of this intriguing social behaviour, both ontogenetically
and phylogenetically. In this review we attempt to syn-
thesize the disparate but related bodies of evidence in
developmental psychology, comparative psychology and
cognitive  neuroscience to create a conceptual framework
within which future studies in these areas might inter-
relate more effectively. Therefore we propose a set of
new  and old conceptual distinctions that allow a concise
perspective on the existing evidence: (1) We  use major-
ity  inﬂuence as a general term to summarise the more
speciﬁc categories 2 and 3. (2) We  use majority-biased trans-
mission  as a mechanism-neutral term, deﬁned solely by
the  observable outcome, characterized by the increased
likelihood of naïve observers to acquire the behaviour
of the majority position relative to no social inﬂuence.
(3) We  use conformity as a second mechanism-neutral
term, deﬁned solely by the observable outcome, charac-
terized by observers discarding their personal behavioural
tendency in favour of the behaviour of the majority. Impor-
tantly,  we propose to organize the majority inﬂuence
deﬁnitions along this dichotomy of naïve vs. experienced
(i.e. in possession of prior knowledge and/or prefer-
ences) individuals for the reason that social information
may  ground differently in individuals based on this spe-
ciﬁc  state-quality. Whereas the behavioural end-result of
acquiring  the majority behaviour may  be the same in both
cases,  and hence the ramiﬁcations on the level of culturaldiversiﬁcation, the operational distinction between major-
ity  inﬂuences in naïve vs. experienced individuals may  be
the  necessary impetus for investigating more closely the
mechanisms and tradeoffs revolving around “conforming”
to  majorities (see van Leeuwen & Haun, in press).
To give a realistic scope to a review like this, we  need to
restrict  our goals: since comprehensive reviews of confor-
mity  in both adults (Bond and Smith, 1996) and teenagers
(Steinberg and Monahan, 2007) exist, we review existing
evidence for majority inﬂuences in children under the age
of  ten years only. We  furthermore review a selection of
relevant studies with non-human animals. Given their rel-
evance  for arguments relating to the phylogenetic origin
of  human social behaviours (Haun et al., 2010; MacLean
et  al., 2012) we  focus largely on non-human primates,
admitting rare excursions to non-primate species if stud-
ies  are of particular relevance. The integration of results
from human and non-human studies on majority inﬂuence
is  still a risky endeavour and riddled with inconsistencies
in both conceptual distinctions and methodologies. Thus,
rather  than hoping to provide a deﬁnitive integration, we
hope  to provide a common framework at a time when a
joint  effort is both possible and necessary.
2. Behavioural patterns under majority inﬂuence
2.1. Majority-biased transmission
The  increased likelihood of naïve observers to acquire the
behaviour of the majority.
Majority-biased transmission refers to the increased
likelihood for naïve individuals to end up with the
behaviour of the majority, where the likelihood of adopt-
ing  the majority strategy is evaluated relative to the
likelihood to adopt that same trait in the absence of inher-
ent  behavioural tendencies or social information (Haun
et  al., 2012). Importantly, this deﬁnition thus refers to
a  behavioural pattern only. No claims are being made
regarding the underlying mechanism(s).
2.1.1. Majority-biased transmission in children
Studies documenting majority-biased transmission in
children  are rare. Recent work by Flynn and colleagues
investigated transmission of new tool-use techniques dur-
ing  natural interactions amongst preschool children (Flynn
and  Whiten, 2010; Whiten and Flynn, 2010). In these stud-
ies,  one individual from a group of children is trained on
each  of the two available strategies to gain a reward from
a  puzzle box. After the trained individuals are reunited
with their respective peer groups, researchers track the
transmission of knowledge across the groups as well as
the  occurrence of alternative strategies. In general, chil-
dren  tended to end up with the technique that was used
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mportantly for the purpose of this review on majority
nﬂuences, however, is the consideration that in these
tudies, the participants were not exposed to a majority
nd minority of group members. Since only one strategy
ets  seeded into the group, it is hard to assess whether
he children were adopting the strategy that most oth-
rs  were using or merely copying the only strategy that
as  demonstrated in the group. Two recent studies tested
ajority-biased transmission in children more directly. In
ne  study, three-year-old children watched a group of adult
emonstrators labelling a novel object. While the major-
ty  of demonstrators used label X, the minority used label
.  Children tended to adopt the label demonstrated by
he  majority (Corriveau et al., 2009). Moreover, children
ater preferably relied on information provided by a sin-
le  member of the majority more than on information
rovided by the dissenter from the earlier demonstration
Corriveau et al., 2009). The activity of ‘labelling’, however,
ight be particularly prone to majority inﬂuence since
anguage-use inherently relies on consensus: The level of
onsensus  among speakers will determine the functional-
ty  of the label directly. Hence, we might expect children
o  be more likely to follow a majority when learning new
abels  than when learning how to use a tool. In another
ecent study, children were exposed to two different sets
f  demonstrations regarding the use of a food-dispenser,
hus a consensus-independent skill. Observers saw peers
rom  their own kindergarten group interact with a food
ispenser in 2 different ways. A majority (3 demonstrators)
sed strategy X to retrieve food, while a minority (1 demon-
trator) used strategy Y to retrieve food from the same
ispenser. A third, equally obvious strategy Z was  never
emonstrated. Two-year old children copied the behaviour
emonstrated by the majority more often than both the
inority behaviour and the undemonstrated option. Chil-
ren  also copied the majority more often than might have
een  expected in absence of any behaviour-inherent or
ocial  information (Haun et al., 2012).
.1.2. Majority-biased transmission in non-human
nimals
Open diffusion studies, similar to the ones described
bove, have also been conducted in several species of
on-human primates (hereafter called ‘primates’). Simi-
ar  to children, primates showed a tendency to end up
ith  the technique that was used most frequently in their
roup  (e.g. chimpanzees: Bonnie et al., 2007; Hopper et al.,
011;  Whiten et al., 2005; capuchins; Dindo et al., 2009).
owever, albeit important for our understanding of social
earning  capacities of primates, these studies are hard to
nterpret  in terms of majority-biased transmission for the
ame  reasons as outlined above (see also van Leeuwen and
aun,  in press). More directly relevant results on primates’
ajority-biased transmission comes from the same study
s  addressed in the previous section (Haun et al., 2012).
gain, both chimpanzee and orangutan observers saw con-
peciﬁcs  from their own  social group interact with a food
ispenser with a majority (3 demonstrators) using strat-
gy  X, a minority (1 demonstrator) using strategy Y and
 third, equally obvious strategy Z that was never demon-
trated. Similar to 2-year old human children, chimpanzeesitive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 61– 71 63
copied the majority behaviour more often than both the
minority behaviour and the undemonstrated option. They
also  copied the majority more often than might have been
expected in absence of any inherent strategy preferences or
social  information. Interestingly, chimpanzees copied the
third,  undemonstrated strategy more often than the strat-
egy  demonstrated by the minority, which could indicate an
active  avoidance of ending up with the minority strategy. In
contrast,  orangutans showed no preference for the majority
strategy over the other two  alternatives (Haun et al., 2012).
Additionally, studies in rats and pigeons have shown
that the likelihood of naïve individuals to copy the food
preference of the majority increased linearly with the size
of  the majority (rats: Chou and Richerson, 1992), and
that  the solution to a food-related task was acquired lin-
early  faster when demonstrated by an increasing number
of  tutors (pigeons: Lefebvre and Giraldeau, 1994). More
recent studies have shown that also sticklebacks (Pike and
Laland,  2010; Webster and Hart, 2006), dogs (Kundey et al.,
2012)  and even fruit-ﬂies (Battesti et al., 2012) are more
likely to acquire the majority behaviour than expected
based on the likelihood to adopt that same strategy in
absence of any inherent strategy preferences or social inﬂu-
ences.  In summary, it appears that both children and other
animals  display majority-biased transmission.
2.2. Conformity
Tendency of minority observers to forgo their own
behavioural tendency by adopting the behaviour of the major-
ity.
Conformity occurs when individuals forgo their knowl-
edge  and/or behavioural preference in order to adopt the
majority  strategy. This deﬁnition is extracted from social
psychology experiments in which participants know-
ingly give false responses when faced with an erroneous
majority. Formal models of social learning use the term
conformity to describe a scenario in which the likelihood
with which an individual might copy the majority strat-
egy  must be signiﬁcantly larger than the relative size of
the  majority – see Section 3 (Boyd and Richerson, 2009;
Efferson et al., 2008; Eriksson et al., 2007; Henrich and
Boyd, 1998). This use of the same term to refer to two
different phenomena in two  different but related ﬁelds of
investigation has caused a lot of confusion. We  hope that
in  the course of this review, we  can make the important
distinctions obvious (see also Claidière and Whiten, 2012;
van  Leeuwen & Haun, in press). The literature on confor-
mity in adults has been summarised in other reviews (Bond,
2005;  Bond and Smith, 1996; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).
Based  on a large body of evidence we  here aim to give an
overview of the general dynamics of conformity in human
adults, thereby creating a backdrop against which we can
discuss  the studies with children below: conformity occurs
across  a wide set of cultural contexts, but varies in its extent
from  culture to culture (Bond and Smith, 1996), coinciding
with differing socialization values (Ellis et al., 1978). Gen-
erally  speaking, adult females conform more than males
(Bond  and Smith, 1996; Eagly and Carli, 1981). The fre-
quency and strength of conformity also varies within the
same  culture due to situational determinants (Bond and
tal Cogn64 D.B.M.  Haun et al. / Developmen
Smith, 1996): Individuals conform more when the stimuli
are  more ambiguous – i.e.  if the amount of noise relative
to  the signal in the stimulus is increased, resulting in a
decrease of subjects’ conﬁdence in their own judgements
(Asch, 1956). When offered incentives for accuracy adults
conform less when tasks are easy, and more when tasks are
hard  (Baron et al., 1996). Furthermore, an effective major-
ity  needs to include at least three peers (Asch, 1956; Bond
and  Smith, 1996); further increases in majority size above
three  still increase the number of conform responses, but
the  effect is not proportional to the increase in majority
size, but diminishes with increasing number of confeder-
ates (Latané, 1981; Latané and Wolf, 1981; Tanford and
Penrod, 1984). Individuals’ tendency to conform increases
if  the majority gives unanimous responses (Asch, 1956) and
if  the majority is composed of familiar peers instead of
strangers (Asch, 1956; Bond and Smith, 1996). Finally adult
individuals seem to conform more in public than when their
response  is anonymous (Allen, 1966; Bond, 2005).
2.2.1. Conformity in children
Most  studies investigating conformity in children match
the  general structure of the original paradigm conceived by
Asch  (1956). One individual, with high level of performance
on  a certain task, is confronted with a majority of peers
who unanimously give a false response. Individuals choose
between  sticking with their own judgement and abandon-
ing  it by adjusting their behaviour to the majority. Already
around the same time as Asch conducted his experiments
with adults, studies demonstrated conformity in children
between the ages of 7 and 10 years (Berenda, 1950). More
recent  studies demonstrated children as young as 4 years
of  age conforming to a majority of adults (Corriveau and
Harris,  2010). Other recent studies have found that 4 year
old  children also conform to a majority of same-age peers
(Haun  and Tomasello, 2011; Walker and Andrade, 1996).
Given  the limited amount of available data, however,
the picture emerging from studies on conformity in chil-
dren  is quite unkempt. In general, it seems fair to say that
conformity in children appears to follow the same structure
found  in adult studies: similar to adults, children seem to
conform  more if the amount of noise relative to the sig-
nal  in the stimulus is increased, resulting in a decrease
of subjects’ conﬁdence in their own judgements (Hamm,
1970; Hoving et al., 1969), although not all studies ﬁnd
this  effect (Iscoe and Williams, 1963; Iscoe et al., 1963).
Also similar to adults, girls seem to conform more than
boys  (Costanzo and Shaw, 1966; Iscoe and Williams, 1963;
Iscoe  et al., 1964), which may  already be true for chil-
dren as young as 4 years of age (Haun and Tomasello,
2011). Not all studies, however, ﬁnd differences in con-
formity between the sexes (Bishop and Beckman, 1971;
Haun  and Tomasello, 2011). Besides gender, other demo-
graphic variables seem to inﬂuence children’s tendency to
conform.  Within the United States for example, a sample of
Caucasian  girls between 7 and 15 years of age conformed
more than African American girls of similar age, while boys’
behaviour did not vary across populations (Iscoe et al.,
1964).  Similarly, rural Mexican children between 7 and 9
years  of age conformed more than their age-matched Anglo
American counterparts (Kagan, 1974). In the latter case,itive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 61– 71
conformity positively correlated with a difference in cogni-
tive  style, i.e. individuals displaying high ﬁeld-dependent
cognitive style (tendency to analyse information relative to
the  surrounding contextual information) conformed more
often  than individuals with a ﬁeld-independent cogni-
tive  style (tendency to process details separately from the
surrounding context) (Witkin et al., 1977). Across ages, con-
formity  on unambiguous tasks declines between the ages
of  3 and 10 years (Bishop and Beckman, 1971; Cohen et al.,
1973;  Hamm, 1970; Hoving et al., 1969; Iscoe et al., 1964;
Walker and Andrade, 1996). Studies using ambiguous tasks
largely  report a slight increase in conformity across the
same  developmental period (Costanzo and Shaw, 1966;
Hamm and Hoving, 1969; Iscoe et al., 1963). In hypothet-
ical situations in which peers urge the child to perform
either anti-social, prosocial, or neutral behaviours, confor-
mity  increased until the age of 10 years, while declining
shortly after (Berndt, 1979). The same and other studies
compared conformity to peers and conformity to parents.
The  tendency to conform to peers’ antisocial behaviour
steadily increased with age, peaking in the teenage years.
Conformity to the prosocial behaviour of peers did not
vary  with age. However, conformity to parents on both
types  of behaviour decreased steadily with age (Berndt,
1979; Bixenstine et al., 1976; Bronfenbrenner, 1967, 1970).
Furthermore, the extent to which children conform to a
majority  appears to be susceptible to social feedback. When
children  between the ages of 6 and 14 years, after having
adjusted their opinion to the majority in a classic con-
formity design, are confronted with objectively correct
responses given by adult models, conformity decreases
(Hamm,  1970). From at least 9 years of age children not only
conform,  but also expect other peers to conform (Killen
et  al., 2002).
2.2.2. Conformity in non-human animals
The results of the open diffusion studies in primates
mentioned in Section 2.1.2 were generally interpreted in
terms  of conformity rather than majority-biased trans-
mission (Bonnie et al., 2007; Dindo et al., 2009; Hopper
et  al., 2011; Whiten et al., 2005). In these open diffusion
studies, individuals ﬁrst acquired one strategy through the
observation of conspeciﬁcs, after which some of them dis-
covered  an equally effective alternative strategy through
individual exploration. Over time, the individuals that dis-
covered  the alternative tended to revert back to their
ﬁrst learned strategy – the only strategy that was seeded
in  the group and thus the most common strategy. This
observation led the authors to argue for the existence of
conformity in primates (see Claidière and Whiten, 2012).
For  several reasons, however, the observation that these
primates tended to converge on one behavioural strategy
does  not necessarily indicate conformity. Besides the ear-
lier  mentioned limitations of the open diffusion design, it
is  unclear whether the individuals reverted back to the
most  common strategy under inﬂuence of a majority or
whether  the presence of a majority coincided with their
normal, individual tendency to favour their ﬁrst learned
behaviour. Especially in the case of chimpanzees, perse-
vering in the ﬁrst acquired behaviour seems a reasonable
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f behavioural conservatism across several different con-
exts  (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini and Whiten,
008;  Bonnie et al., 2012). Moreover, the ‘reversions’ to
he  most common behaviour do not test for conformity as
eﬁned  above: rather than having to change their initially
cquired behaviour in order to match the majority, the des-
gnated  ‘conformists’ needed to retain their most familiar
trategy (see van Leeuwen and Haun, in press).
The most compelling argument for the existence of
onformity in animals comes from the aforementioned
tudies in sticklebacks, where both three-spined (Webster
nd  Hart, 2006) and nine-spined sticklebacks (Pike and
aland,  2010) seem to give precedence to the majority
trategy over their personal experience. In the former,
ticklebacks tended to spend more time foraging at the
ood  patch where the majority of demonstrators had been
resent  compared to the food patch where the focal ﬁsh
ad  experienced food in previous private sampling ses-
ions  (Webster and Hart, 2006). Elaborating on this design,
ike  and Laland (2010) investigated several conditions
ith differently sized majorities, where they found that
he  focal sticklebacks were disproportionately inclined to
orgo  their personal preference in favour of the food patch
emonstrated by the majority conditional on the increasing
relative) majority size (Pike and Laland, 2010). The same
rocesses have also been studied in guppies, but unless the
ndividuals were forced to choose between a costly option
nd  copying the shoal’s behaviour, guppies stuck with their
ndividually acquired knowledge (Kendal et al., 2004).
Studies in rats showed that individuals change their
ocation preference after observing a conspeciﬁc model
Konopasky and Telegdy, 1977) and their food preference
fter smelling the breath of one or two conspeciﬁcs in suc-
ession,  even to the extent of preferring unpalatable or
resumably toxic food (Galef and Whiskin, 2008; Jolles
t  al., 2011). However, since no majority demonstrations
ere included in these studies, it remains to be investi-
ated whether the preferences changed through the same
echanism(s) that might underlie majority inﬂuences.
In  sum, the taxonomic distribution of conformity
emains as of yet unclear. On the one hand, results seem
o  indicate that at least humans and sticklebacks share
he  tendency to adjust personal preferences to majority
trategies, probably indicative of convergent evolutionary
rocesses (Laland et al., 2011). On the other hand, studies
ave  not yet been designed adequately to compare confor-
ity  across species.
Importantly, all instances of majority inﬂuence
escribed thus far are deﬁned by statistical behavioural
utcomes, i.e. the likelihood of individuals to adopt the
ajority strategy with or without prior behavioural
endencies. Identifying the mechanisms behind the
ehavioural end-results will enable us to compare
ajority inﬂuence across ages and species with greater
recision.
.  Mechanisms behind majority inﬂuenceAfter considering some of the existing evidence for
ajority inﬂuences in children and other animals, the
uestion remains whether children and other animalsitive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 61– 71 65
copy  the majority strategy because they are biased towards
copying what most other individuals are doing, or whether
other  mechanisms are involved that amount to the same
end-result.
Most  studies on majority inﬂuences aim to study the
learning strategy ‘copy-the-majority’ (Laland, 2004), in
other  words, the bias to copy the majority because it is
the  majority. Formal models suggest that natural selec-
tion  should favour a copy-the-majority strategy because
it  helps individuals to quickly adopt the locally adaptive
behavioural variants, especially in a spatially variable envi-
ronment  with migration between subpopulations (Boyd
and  Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Kameda and
Nakanishi,  2002; Kandler and Laland, 2009; Wakano and
Aoki,  2007). For this reason we would expect the copy-
the-majority strategy to be present in many different social
species  across various families of social animals, including
humans.
However, although assumed by many to be the fun-
damental underlying mechanism, majority-biased trans-
mission  does not necessarily imply a copy-the-majority
strategy. An increased likelihood to end up with the
behaviour of the majority can often also be explained by
several  alternative copying strategies. For example, ran-
dom  copying, i.e. a mechanism that does not take into
account any contextual information, can result in majority-
biased transmission: if observers copy an individual at
random, the likelihood to copy a majority member exceeds
that  of copying a minority member. In consequence, the
likelihood with which individuals copy the most common
technique exceeds that of any other available alternative
(Mesoudi, 2009; Mesoudi and Lycett, 2009).
Moreover, if copying is not random, majority-biased
transmission can still come about through multiple alter-
native  mechanisms other than ‘copy-the-majority’. For
example, if we consider that the majority by deﬁnition
encompasses most individuals in the group, the strategy
used by most individuals and the strategy used most often
are  usually conﬂated. Similarly, the strategy used by most
individuals and the strategy with the highest probabil-
ity to be encountered ﬁrst are conﬂated: the likelihood
that the ﬁrst ‘demonstrator’ an observer encounters is a
majority  member equals the size of the majority in the
population, which by deﬁnition is larger than 0.5. Assum-
ing  that other model-characteristics such as prestige and
skill  distribute evenly across the population, the majority
would also include most prestigious and most skilled indi-
viduals.  As a result, several different social learning biases
might  underlie majority-biased transmission, such as the
preference to copy what most individuals do, what the
most  prestigious individuals do (Chudek et al., 2012), what
individuals do that are similar to the observer (Rosekrans,
1967), what the most skilled individuals do (Corriveau
and Harris, 2009) or any combination thereof. The rela-
tive  importance of these different factors might of course
vary  across species and ages, resulting in majority-biased
transmission based on varying, equiﬁnal compositions of
underlying  mechanisms.
One  way  to shed light on the mechanisms underlying
majority inﬂuences is to observe whether the likelihood
with which an individual might copy the majority strategy
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is signiﬁcantly larger than the relative size of the major-
ity  (disproportionate copying). If this is the case, at least
random copying can be refuted as the underlying mech-
anism of the majority inﬂuence. Formal models of social
learning call this scenario conformist transmission (Boyd
and  Richerson, 2009; Efferson et al., 2008; Eriksson et al.,
2007;  Henrich and Boyd, 1998). Conformist transmission
has however rarely been shown in adults (recent absence
of  evidence: (Claidière et al., 2012; Coultas, 2004; Eriksson
and  Coultas, 2009); recent positive evidence: (Morgan
et al., 2012)), and never in children (recent absence of
evidence: (Haun et al., 2012; Whiten and Flynn, 2010;
Corriveau and Harris, 2009)). Also, none of the aforemen-
tioned studies in primates reported a disproportionate
tendency to copy the majority of group members, leav-
ing  open the possibility that chimpanzees only ever copy
other  individuals at random (Haun et al., 2012). However,
the aforementioned studies in sticklebacks have shown
that  sticklebacks can match the foraging strategy demon-
strated by the majority (Webster and Hart, 2006), even to
the  extent of disproportionate copying (Pike and Laland,
2010), providing the proof that conformist transmission
exists in non-human animals (for a detailed recent review
see  Morgan and Laland, 2012).
However, while the presence of conformist trans-
mission excludes random copying from the possible
mechanisms that amount to majority-biased transmis-
sion, it does not necessarily indicate a copy-the-majority
strategy. For reasons outlined above, alternative mech-
anisms such as copy-the-most-frequent strategy or
copy-the-most-productive strategy might explain the
behavioural end-results under a conformist transmission
scenario. One of the aforementioned studies reporting on
majority-biased transmission in children and chimpanzees
attempted to shed light on the underlying mechanism.
Haun et al. (2012) separated majority effects from fre-
quency and order effects by varying the number of
demonstrators and the number of demonstrations inde-
pendently of each other, while controlling for order of
demonstration (Haun et al., 2012). Two-year-old children
and  chimpanzees, but not orangutans, preferably copied
the  majority’s solution to a novel task. Only the chil-
dren also relied on the frequency of demonstrations when
the  number of individuals was equal across strategies.
All three species in this study largely ignored the order
of  demonstration. It remains to be investigated whether
observers value the order of demonstration when the
number of individuals and the number of attempts are
controlled for. More generally, it needs to be empirically
investigated to what extent the majority of individuals
afford other learning strategies than copy-the-majority. For
instance,  while the likelihood that individual characteris-
tics that are predicted to be adaptive bases of attraction
(e.g. prestige, skill; see Laland, 2004) are present in the
majority is statistically higher than for any minority sim-
ply  due to numbers, future studies should investigate
the distribution of individual characteristics across the
majority and minority of a population. Moreover, the
even  more complex interplay between genetic predisposi-
tions, environmental inﬂuences and cultural determinants
poses a further intriguing challenge for the endeavour toitive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 61– 71
single  out the mechanism involved in behavioural pat-
terns  like majority-biased transmission. One promising
attempt at this endeavour is being made by researchers
that are developing tools to recognize statistical signatures
of  cultural transmission within (non-human) animal popu-
lations  (Boogert et al., 2008; Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt
et  al., 2010; Kendal et al., 2009; McElreath et al., 2005,
2008). Another fruitful perspective might be that of inter-
individual differences (e.g. Efferson et al., 2008; McElreath
et  al., 2005). Where behavioural patterns are usually scru-
tinised  on the population level, for reasons of adaptability,
it is reasonable to assume that individuals differ in their
learning capacities as well as their learning preferences. For
instance,  in the case of social learning preferences, indi-
viduals can, over a multitude of different situations, be
described along a continuum with dedicated conformists
at one end of the scale and independent mavericks at the
other  (see Efferson et al., 2008). Integrating this perspective
in  studies exploring the mechanisms by which individ-
uals navigate through their (social) environments might
be  helpful in the cross-species and cross-age comparison
of majority inﬂuences.
Related  to the endeavour to identify the responsi-
ble mechanism for majority-biased transmission across
species is the investigation of the different motivations that
could  instigate certain mechanisms. Especially copy-the-
majority, the tendency to copy the majority because it is the
majority,  has sparked both theoretical and empirical inves-
tigations  into the potential suite of different individual
motivations, especially in cases where individuals abandon
their  behavioural tendencies and convictions in favour of
the  majority position (conformity). In the next section, we
will  review the extent to which empirical data sheds light
on  the motivational component of the copy-the-majority
mechanism and indicate further ways to understand the
existence and ontogeny of majority inﬂuences in general.
4.  Motivations behind majority inﬂuence
Social psychologists discuss two interacting motiva-
tions resulting in copy-the-majority, especially when
it  results in conformity (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955):
behavioural optimisation (informational conformity) and
social  strategising (normative conformity). Informational
conformity describes the motivation to adopt a major-
ity  position because it is taken to be a reliable source of
information about a shared objective reality. There might
often  be good reasons to trust the majority over oneself:
albeit not necessarily the best available option, the strategy
adopted by most individuals is an aggregate of individ-
ual learning outcomes and thus likely – if many converge
on the same strategy–relatively safe, reliable and produc-
tive.  Formal models support this idea by showing that
adopting the majority behaviour is an effective strategy
at  least in spatially variable environments with migration
between subpopulations, since it accelerates the acquisi-
tion  of locally adaptive behaviour (Boyd and Richerson,
1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998). Normative conformity
describes the motivation to adopt a majority position
because of the social beneﬁts of conforming relative to dis-
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Due to this motivational heterogeneity, the same level
f  conformity across ages, sexes, populations or species
ight be based on different compositions of underlying
otivations. Experiments have tried to distinguish the
elative  contribution of informational and normative moti-
ations  by varying the privacy of the participants while
iving their response. The idea behind this manipula-
ion is that normative conformity will often be driven by
he  sake of public appearance alone (public conformity),
hile informational conformity often results in a genuine,
ocially mediated change in attitudes and/or perception
private conformity). Some reports in adults (Asch, 1956)
s  well as preschool children (Haun and Tomasello, 2011)
ound  lower rates of conformity if participants, after being
xposed  to the majority opinion, responded only in the
resence of the experimenter, but not the majority. The
uthors of these studies concluded that the reduction of
onformity in the absence of a social consequence demon-
trated a partial contribution of normative motivations on
rials  during which participants responded in public. A
arge  meta-analysis, however, found no reliable correlation
etween the privacy of responses and the level of confor-
ity  across studies (Bond and Smith, 1996). It therefore, as
f  today, remains challenging to convincingly identify the
omposition of motivations underlying conformity using
ehavioural experimentation only, making interpretations
f similarities and differences across species, sexes, cul-
ures  and ages rather difﬁcult to substantiate (Cialdini and
oldstein,  2004; David and Turner, 2001; Wood, 2000).
.1.  Can physiological measures differentiate between
ifferent motivations to conform?
The use of physiological measures in experimental
esigns may  provide additional information about types
f  conformity and the underlying motivations (Bogdonoff
t  al., 1962; Mojzisch and Krug, 2008). Recent functional
agnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies investigating
onformity have produced variable results depending on
he  task involved. One group of studies explored the effect
f  social inﬂuences on subjective ratings of consumer items
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010), faces (Klucharev et al.,
009;  Zaki et al., 2011) and abstract symbols (Mason et al.,
009).  These studies found that social pressure altered
rain activations in regions previously associated with
ssessment of subjective value (e.g. the ventral striatum
nd orbitofrontal cortex). These results led to the assertion
hat  social pressure can change the subjective value origi-
ally  associated with the items (Zaki et al., 2011). However,
ocial pressure seems to exert more effects; two  stud-
es  that used conformity paradigms outside the subjective
aluation domain indicated that conformity affects other
egions  depending on the speciﬁc task requirements. For
xample,  Berns et al. (2005) used a conformity protocol in
he  context of a mental rotation task and found that confor-
ity  affected the occipito-parietal network usually foundo  be involved in mental rotation tasks. Edelson et al. (2011)
emonstrated that conformity in memory is subserved by
ctivation  in the hippocampal complex, a critical region
or  memory processing. In summary, conformity induceditive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 61– 71 67
alterations in behaviour correspond to measurable changes
in  brain activity in task speciﬁc regions.
Although different conformity paradigms produce dif-
ferent  neurophysiological effects, there appear to be areas
of  commonality among various experiments. For exam-
ple,  in response to social information conﬂicting with
personal beliefs, enhanced brain activity has frequently
been observed in posterior medial frontal regions and the
insula  (Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010;
Edelson  et al., 2011; Klucharev et al., 2009). The medial
frontal regions were primarily found in the dorsal ante-
rior  cingulate cortex and surrounding areas, which are
considered to be involved in processes including track-
ing  decision uncertainty, conﬂict monitoring and adaptive
goal  directed behaviour (Botvinick et al., 2004; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Falk et al., 2010; Klucharev
et al., 2009). Anterior insula activation has been pro-
posed to subserve a variety of processes including response
to  aversive/negative events, theory of mind, and inte-
roception (Critchley et al., 2004; Gallese et al., 2004;
Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003). More speciﬁcally, regarding
social norms, insula and dorsal anterior cingulate activ-
ity  have been proposed to model degrees of discrepancy
between group norms and personal beliefs in a fashion akin
to  a prediction error, which may  then lead to subsequent
behavioural adjustments (Klucharev et al., 2009; Montague
and  Lohrenz, 2007).
Based  on the aforementioned studies we  suggest a two-
phase  model for conformity effects in the brain (Fig. 1).
(1)  Regardless of the speciﬁcs of a given task, confronta-
tion with external pressures, which contradict internal
conceptions, results in increased brain activation in
task invariant regions (Fig. 1A) such as the dorsal ante-
rior cingulate and the anterior insula. Activation in
these regions probably corresponds to task indepen-
dent factors (e.g. subjective degree of conﬂict, aversion,
or mental perspective taking) and correlates with the
size of discrepancy experienced by the individual.
(2) Activity in task invariant regions may  provide brain
sub-systems involved in a speciﬁc task (i.e. task vari-
ant regions, Fig. 1B and C) with a signal indicating the
need for a behavioural adjustment. Changes in these
sub-systems will then generate the behavioural man-
ifestation of conformity in the given task. Activations
here need not be mutually exclusive; for example, a
change in memory may  involve a change in subjective
value (and vice versa).
Importantly, given the temporal resolution limitations
of fMRI, more research is needed to determine this pro-
posed causal relationship between task invariant and task
variant  regions. One innovative approach used by Klucharev
et  al. (2011), is to employ trans-magnetic stimulation to
deactivate the postulated task invariant region of the pos-
terior  medial frontal cortex. They found that deactivation
of this region reduced levels of behavioural conformity
regarding face attractiveness valuations. In a complemen-
tary approach Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2012) used a
pharmacological intervention that has been demonstrated
to enhance dopaminergic activity in task speciﬁc regions of
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task var
ed not bFig. 1. (A) Illustrative example of two proposed task invariant regions sh
the  anterior insula (back panel). (B and C) illustrative examples of two 
hippocampus  for memory tasks (C). Activations in these sub-systems ne
corresponding  slices in a coronal view.
valuation (e.g. ventral striatum) (Volkow et al., 2001). This
resulted  in higher levels of conformity following moder-
ate  social conﬂict. Combining these approaches with fMRI
may  provide insight into the function and relationship of
task  variant and task invariant regions.
Several neuroimaging studies have tried to distinguish
between conformity leading to mere compliance (public
conformity) and conformity leading to actual changes in
beliefs  (private conformity). This distinction is related to the
underlying  motivations for conformity since informational
conformity is posited to lead to more instances of private
change whereas normative conformity to relatively more
instances of compliance (Smith and Mackie, 2007).
Under the assumption that a private change in value
judgements will induce a corresponding and measurable
change in activity of brain circuits associated with sub-
jective valuation (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki
et  al., 2011), one fruitful approach would be to investi-
gate brain activation in areas associated with subjective
value (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011).
By  contrast, public conformity will less likely alter per-
sonal valuations and will thus not result in such changes
(Berns et al., 2010). A different approach, taken by Edelson
et  al. (2011), is to directly compare brain activation dur-
ing  conformity events that led to behavioural compliance
only vs. conformity events that led to actual changes in
memory. Consistent with our model (Fig. 1), the differ-
ences found so far between conformity types were not
found  in the regions associated with general task invari-
ant  processes but rather in the task variant sub-systems.
Activity in task invariant regions in both public and private
conformity appears to show sensitivity to general factors
such  as the degree of dissonance between individual andeneral conformity related activity: the cingulate cortex (front panel) and
iant sub-systems; the ventral striatum for evaluative tasks (B), and the
e mutually exclusive. The diminutive panels on A, B and C illustrate the
group  opinions. In contradistinction, when brain activ-
ity  modulations are observed in the task variant regions,
this  seems to indicate that private change has occurred
in  this domain. For example, activation changes in regions
associated with memory may  indicate a change in private
memory representations and changes in regions associ-
ated  with processing of value might indicate a change in
subjective valuation.
It  is not clear however to what extent such acti-
vations are unique to inﬂuence engendered by a social
source. Three studies directly compared the inﬂuence of
information delivered via an interpersonal source to the
same  information delivered via a non-social source (i.e.
a  computer). Two  studies (Berns et al., 2005; Klucharev
et al., 2009) found that activations in regions involved
in social conformity were weaker if the source of inﬂu-
ence was  non-social. This was  taken as an indication that
social  and non-social inﬂuences activate the same brain
networks and differ quantitatively rather than qualitatively
(Klucharev et al., 2009). A third study compared differences
between social and non-social inﬂuences resulting in pri-
vate  conformity (Edelson et al., 2011). Here, the researchers
found that although social and non-social inﬂuences indeed
elicited  activations in common regions, social inﬂuences
that induced long-lasting conformity had unique brain
correlates (e.g. heightened amygdala-hippocampal con-
nectivity) when compared to corresponding long-term
changes induced by non-social information (Edelson et al.,
2011).It  seems from this preliminary evidence that social and
non-social inﬂuences share at least some brain networks,
whereas other areas of activation are unique. This view is
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elies, at least in part, on systems that are used in learn-
ng  from non-social sources (Behrens et al., 2008), but may
lso  have additional distinct brain mechanisms (Adolphs,
006; Burke et al., 2010).
.  Majority inﬂuence in children and other animals:
oncluding remarks
Considering the current state of the empirical evidence
t  seems fair to say that several animal species, includ-
ng human children, are in one way or another subject
o  majority inﬂuences. Studies in children and other ani-
als  are, however, difﬁcult to integrate for three reasons:
i)  majority inﬂuences have not been operationalised com-
ensurably. To understand how majority inﬂuence might
e  different in humans from that of other species, study
esigns need to be calibrated across species; (ii) many stud-
es  convolute behavioural end-results with the underlying
echanisms; (iii) while human studies have started to
nvestigate the proximate motivations underlying majority
nﬂuence, especially conformity, animal studies have not
et  done so.
For  now, the growing body of evidence seems to indicate
hat  majority-biased transmission exists across species,
anging from human children to fruit-ﬂies. Researchers
ave started a promising effort to identify compositions of
echanisms behind majority inﬂuence across species, ages
nd  scenarios and we hope that this review will help push
his  ﬁeld of investigation forward. Conformity has thus far
nly  been shown in humans and sticklebacks, where only
umans  have shown to conform due to both informational
nd normative motivations. The lack of information on con-
ormity  tendencies in other species is however responsible
or  this preliminary conclusion; with this review we hope
o  encourage researchers to study conformity in animals
ore commensurably. The underlying motivations have
nly  rarely been studied in children and never in other
nimals. However, we might well ﬁnd the most interest-
ng  differences across ages and species in the underlying
otivations. To put it in more stark terms, species dif-
erences, as well as differences across human children of
ifferent  ages will not be fully understood without tracking
he  underlying mechanistic and motivational composition
riving majority inﬂuence. Cognitive Neuroscience might
rovide  methodological tools that will supplement prior
fforts  to track the motivational state underlying children’s
nd  adults’ conformist behaviour. In this way the combina-
ion  of clear conceptual distinctions, detailed behavioural
aradigms and additional physiological measures should
llow  us to understand the ontogeny and phylogeny of
ajority inﬂuences.
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